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Europe, the Green Line and the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian border: closing the gap 
between discourse and practice? 
 
Federica Bicchi (London School of Economics) and Benedetta Voltolini (Sciences Po, Paris) 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The article analyses how the Europeans (meaning European states and the EC/EU) have 
progressively turned a discourse about the Israeli-Palestinian border into a foreign policy 
practice. While much of the literature highlights the existence of a 'gap between discourse 
and practice' when it comes to Europeans’ foreign policy stance towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, we argue that the gap is dynamic and has changed across time. In the absence of an 
internationally and locally recognised border between Israel and Palestine, the Europeans 
have aimed at constructing one on the 1949 armistice line, the so-called Green Line. They 
have done so in stages, by first formulating a discursive practice about the need for a border, 
then establishing economic practices in the late 1980s-early 1990s, and most recently 
practicing a legal frame of reference for relations with Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
(PA) based on the Green Line. The outcome is that, for what concerns European countries 
and EU legislation, the Green Line has been increasingly taken as the Israeli-Palestinian 
border. However, gaps never fully close and more contemporary events seem in fact to point 
to a re-opening of the gap, as the article explores. 
 
Introduction 
 
The article analyses how the Europeans (meaning European states and the European 
Communities (EC)/European Union (EU)) have progressively turned a discourse about the 
Israeli-Palestinian border into a foreign policy practice. In the absence of an internationally 
and locally recognised border between Israel and Palestine, the Europeans have aimed at 
constructing one on the 1949 armistice line, the so-called Green Line. They have done so 
from the early 1970s onwards and increasingly in a coordinated manner, hence the reference 
to Europe. Moreover, they have done so in stages, by first formulating a discursive practice 
about the need for a border, then establishing economic practices in the late 1980s-early 
1990s, and most recently practicing a legal frame of reference for relations with Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) based on the Green Line. The outcome is that, for what concerns 
European countries and EU legislation, the Green Line has been increasingly taken as the 
Israeli-Palestinian border. This article traces the conceptual and practical history of this 
development, as well as its limitations. The aim is to provide an understanding of how 
European external relations evolve across time, in this case from discursive practice to 
economic and legal practices,
1
 by focusing on the case of the Israeli-Palestinian border, taken 
not just in its legal meaning, but also as a discursive, practical and analytical device.
2
 
 
The starting point of this article’s analysis is the gap between the Europeans’ discursive 
practice and implementation practices in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We consider 
this gap to be dynamic, just as all gaps between discourse and practice in politics. This goes 
against much of the existing literature, especially on EU-Israel relations, which tends not only 
to identify a gap, but also to reify it as a permanent feature of EU foreign policy towards the 
area. By drawing on a variety of analytical and theoretical contributions, we aim to show that 
while gaps are a staple feature of politics, they open and close, though never fully. In the case 
2 
 
of the Europeans’ stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the gap has been closing during the last 
three decades, and especially so after 2008, although it is on the verge of opening up again. 
 
At first, this might seem a basket case. The Arab-Israeli conflict is probably one of the issues 
in European foreign policy in which the word “gap” has most been used, to indicate 
inconsistencies between Europe’s words and actions. There is a ‘rhetoric-practice gap’3 , an 
‘expectations-delivery gap’ in economic relations, 4 ‘convergent parallels’5 and more 
generally a situation of ‘inglorious disarray’6 and ‘failure’7. Indeed, while decolonisation and 
the Cold War managed to create and “freeze” the vast majority of political boundaries across 
the globe,
8
 this specific boundary managed to escape that fate and continues to challenge 
international actors. The long rehashed claim that the border will be ‘subject to direct 
negotiations’ sounds hollow and untenable. 
 
While certainly a lot could be done to improve consistency in European foreign policy and to 
end the conflict, our argument is that the width of the gap between discourse and practice is 
changeable and it changes exactly because of the tension between different types of practice, 
as this case demonstrates. We argue that one way in which policy change occurs is because of 
a discourse (or, more accurately, a discursive practice) that opens the way to (or anchors) a 
change in other practices (such as economic and legal practices). As it has been suggested, 
we should put at the centre of our analysis the “dynamic interplay between discourse and 
practice”,9 if only because the existing tension “between the potential capacities of a given 
semiotic code on the one hand and, on the other, any particular specification of it”.10  
 
In particular, we aim to show that the Green Line has been the focal concept that anchored 
the ensuing practices. Largely independently from the situation on the ground, Europeans 
have progressively turned it into the Israeli-Palestinian border for what concerns European 
countries and EU legislation. They have done so by first conceptually and discursively 
justifying the need for a border and identifying it in the Green Line, more clearly so than any 
other international actor. Second, they have aimed to implement it in economic agreements 
and related practices, despite difficulties and inconsistencies. Finally, they have endowed the 
Green Line with partial legal meaning in a string of legal and administrative acts issued since 
2010. Developments in 2016, however, are likely to challenge and possibly revert this trend. 
 
It is important to notice that the expression ‘Green Line’ stands for the awkward, but more 
precise, formulation ‘the armistice lines agreed in 1949 in separate bilateral agreements 
between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria on the other.’ 
Our focus here is on the West Bank segment that was agreed between Israel and (then known 
as) Transjordan.
11
 Part of it was settled in the 1994 Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan, 
but the rest constitutes the boundary between Israel and the West Bank, largely expected to 
constitute the boundaries of the future state of Palestine. In 1949, the Green Line was the 
result of military confrontations erupting right after the establishment of the State of Israel on 
14 May 1948. It bears no relationship to the UN Partition Plan (UNGA Resolution 181, on 29 
November 1947), nor to the acceptance of Israel to the UN (UNGA Resolution 273, on 11 
May 1949), which did not specify the new state’s borders. Rather, it reflects the specific 
position of force at the time of the armistice, which in turn mirrored “the distribution of 
Jewish settlements established over the previous 50 years”12 As such, it has often been 
considered indefensible (or “rotten”)13. It was wiped out by the 1967 war, which led to the 
acquisition by Israel of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as the Golan Heights and 
the Sinai (including the Gaza Strip). Despite the international community’s consensus around 
UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), which emphasized the “withdrawal of Israeli 
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armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,”14 facts on the ground seemed to 
doom the Green Line to non-existence
15
 until the 1987 Intifada and the Oslo Accords in the 
1990s, which brought it back for security and administrative purposes. However, this very 
short history of the Green Line as it occurred on the ground is largely independent from the 
account of how it became the focal point of European foreign policy and as such came to 
affect European practices, as we are going to see. 
 
We explore our argument in four steps. First, we show how practice approaches contribute to 
a clearer understanding of policy gaps in IR, Policy Analysis and European Studies, as well 
as shed light on our case study. Second, we analyse the evolution of the Europeans’ 
discursive practice about the definition of the border between Israel and Palestine in the 
decade 1970-1980. Third, we examine how this discursive practice affected economic 
practices. We then address the shift to legal and administrative practices. Finally, we 
conclude by reflecting on how gaps can close, but also re-open, and what this tells us about 
the way in which European foreign policy – and practices more generally – evolve. 
 
 
From discourse to practice: the border as an anchor in EU foreign policy  
 
While much of the existing literature on European foreign policy and the Arab-Israeli conflict 
(and especially on EU-Israel relations) identifies a gap between the Europeans’ discourse and 
their practices towards the area, we argue both on analytical and empirical grounds that this 
gap is not set in stone. On the contrary, as Policy Analysis, European studies and 
International Relations suggest, gaps are dynamic features of politics, as discourses and 
practices interact on the ground. Therefore, while we agree that gaps exist and matter, we aim 
to push the discussion further by suggesting ways in which gaps’ width can vary, by focusing 
on the relationship between practices. In particular, we suggest that discursive practices, 
when they embody constitutive rules, can anchor other types of practices.
16
  
 
The first point to address is what kind of gap is under scrutiny here. Our focus is on the gap 
between what an actor (in this case Europe, broadly defined) says and what it does. 
Therefore, we are not focusing on the actual impact of an actor’s policy on the ground, often 
analysed in terms of ‘effectiveness’ of the Europeans’ position, because impact is at least in 
part beyond the actor’s reach. Analyses of Europe’s “power deficit” in the Middle East17  are 
thus beyond the remit of our analysis.  
 
Rather, we are scrutinising the gap between, on the one hand, practices related to text 
production and distribution (discursive practices) and, on the other, non-discursive practices, 
as in patterns of social actions that are more centred on text consumption, including acts and 
decisions committing resources.
18
 This gap is often referred to as the gap between ‘discourse 
and practice’ or about an actor’s ‘coherence.’19 But it is more appropriately understood as the 
difference between different types of practices, some centred on the production of discourses 
and some referring to those discourse to legitimise actions and actors. 
 
There is a widespread consensus among scholars that not only there is always a gap between 
‘discourse and practice,’ but also the EU is a particularly bad case and not just in terms of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Policy Analysis has long since established that ‘great expectations’ at 
the centre (‘in Washington’) are regularly dashed at the periphery (‘in Oakland’), when 
policy priorities decided by the central government come to be implemented by a different set 
of actors.
20
 Brussels is not different in this respect, just slightly worse,
21
 given the complex 
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nature of European cooperation as a foreign policy system. Hill identified the problem early 
on, in the ‘capability-expectations’ gap,22 which points to the distance between what 
European cooperation is expected to do in foreign policy and what it is actually able to do. 
Toje has further elaborated on this by pointing to the ‘consensus-expectations’ gap, linking 
the gap to the EU unanimity rule in foreign policy.
23
 Implementation of a foreign policy 
position is thus bound to create dilemmas for the EU and European actors more generally.
24
 
 
The existence of a gap between what Europeans say and do in relation to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict dominates the specialist literature. A plurality of authors refer directly to it, in a 
seemingly unending string of observations: “one can make the case that nowhere has the gap 
between European rhetoric and action been more obvious”.25 The “declaratory diplomacy” of 
the EU cannot hide the divergence between “rhetorical goals and actual conduct,” as the 
Europeans have condemned violations of human rights but not used conditionality and not 
disrupted economic relations with Israel,
26
 as also stressed by Del Sarto.
27
 The gap is not just 
in human rights. In international trade, there is a mismatch between “impressive European 
rhetoric regarding envisaged special trade relations and the EU’s much more modest 
willingness/ability to establish such relations”.28 We might even see a “double gap” between 
the EU’s normative discourse about human rights and their actual promotion, on the one 
hand, and between the normative discourse and economic practices more generally, on the 
other.
29
 In fact, there seems to be a number of gaps and contradictory discursive practices, 
which would make it impossible to close or narrow a gap without affecting negatively the 
others. 
 
However, while gaps exist, they are not static. The relationship between discursive practices 
and implementing practices is dynamic and has to be analysed on the basis of a number of 
factors. Dynamism and transformation is the key message of Policy Analysis, according to 
which policy implementation continues the policy making process, just with different 
actors.
30
 Even in the case of the EU, the ‘capability-expectations gap’ can close, depending 
on available resources.
31
 
 
How can we conceptualise a dynamic relationship between discursive practices, on one hand, 
and other types of practices, on the other, if we go beyond the ‘no relationship’ hypothesis 
about discourse and practice, as well as beyond the ‘static relationship’ that characterises 
much of the literature on this case study? One option is represented by post-structuralism, 
according to which discourse determines other practices and no actual behaviour can be 
conceived outside of a semantic field that provides it with meaning.
32
 Any discursive 
development is thus mirrored in a change in non-discursive practices, and any gap between 
‘discourse and practice’ is actually a gap between different discourses, enabling (or 
constraining) different practices. From this perspective, it is not possible to argue that 
discourse and practice go in different direction, as Gordon and Pardo have argued, for 
instance, when they suggest that the existence of the Europeans’ normative discourse actually 
enables the opposite economic practice of trading with Israel thanks to the Europeans’ 
shallow concern for human rights.
33
  
 
Constructivist and (some) rational choice scholars have also highlighted the influence of 
discourses, which can have the ‘unintended’ effect of fostering implementation. In the case of 
EU enlargement during the 1990s, for instance, Schimmelfennig has claimed that Western 
European countries became “entrapped by their arguments and obliged to behave as if they 
had taken them seriously” in order to maintain their reputation.34 In his analysis, rhetorical 
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entrapment brings about behavioural change on the basis of a discourse that found an 
audience leveraging actors’ credibility.  
 
From the perspective of practice approaches, discursive practices emerge from, but also have 
an effect on the broader landscape of practices, especially by anchoring them to a text 
specifying constitutive rules. Neumann exemplifies this by quoting de Certeau and his 
example of story-telling rituals of the Romans, who in anticipation of political change, such 
as going to war or establishing a new alliance, went on a procession across the border with 
the future enemy/ally while narrating the future developments: “stories that ‘go in a 
procession’ ahead of social practices in order to open a field for them”.35 This does not entail 
that discursive practices always translates into non-discursive ones or that there is nothing to 
be understood outside discourse. Practices are interconnected in different (but always 
contingent) ways. The point here is that some practices can “anchor, control or organize 
others”36 and this is the case especially when they embody “constitutive rules” specifying 
who is in and who is out
37
  – a case that is particularly fitting here.38 The reference to the 
Green Line and the pre-June 1967 border thus anchors other non-discursive practices because 
it narrates a specific story of inclusion and exclusion.  
 
Therefore, we suggest that it is possible to read the empirical evidence of European foreign 
policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict as the development of a discursive practice centred 
on the role of the Green Line, which has anchored the establishment of economic and then 
legal/administrative practices. In this, we see a parallel with authors such as Persson,
39
who 
has highlighted how European declarations have contributed to legitimise a specific 
understanding of what “just peace” means in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, one that 
would envisage the creation of a Palestinian state. We also echo (with a different theoretical 
apparatus and a less linear logic at work) the evolution from a community of information to a 
community of action that Müller describes (2011, p.28-31).
40
  
 
We thus proceed to show how the Europeans’ discursive practice emerged, how it anchored 
economic practice and, more recently, legal/administrative ones, before returning to the issue 
of how practices can also unravel and ‘gaps’ open up again. 
 
An emerging anchor for future practices: the codification of the Green Line as the 
cornerstone of the Europeans’ position  
 
In this section, we will follow how a discursive practice that was to serve as an anchor for 
other future practices emerged in the first place, and how it related to other discursive 
practices in the international debate of the time. It is no surprise that, given the discussion 
around the UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), the issue of the border and where 
should Israel retreat to was high on the agenda in 1971, right after the Europeans had started 
cooperating in 1970 on matters of foreign policy through European Political Cooperation 
(EPC). What is surprising is the degree of convergence on the French position that emerged 
as soon as the debate started and has been maintained until recently. While the Europeans 
often justified their position based on the international one, they were in fact at the forefront 
of the debate. Their consensus on this point not only contributed to make EPC a relative 
success, but also anticipated much of the UN and US positions. The often-told tale of the 
convergence of the Europeans during the 1970s refers to what was to happen beyond the 
Green Line. But the issue of borders was settled almost by the start.  
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At the first EPC meeting in 1970 and at the insistence of France, the then Six agreed to 
prepare a joint paper, which came to be known as Schumann Paper (after Maurice Schumann, 
French minister of Foreign Affairs). It brought together separate reports prepared on freedom 
of navigation, the establishment of demilitarised areas, Jerusalem and the issue of the 
Palestinians. The second point included a reference to the Green Line that was stronger than 
UNSC Res.242, as it envisaged “le retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires 
occupés lors du recent conflit, compte tenu éventuellement de rectifications mineures agréées 
[sic] par les parties, sur les frontières et les lignes antérieures à ce conflit.” 41 While 
consensus might have been helped by French being the main language in EPC at the time 
(hence playing on the difference between the French and the English version of UNSC 
Res.242), the Six ministers also agreed on the document at the ministerial meeting on 13 May 
1971.
42
 The Italians had doubts about the substance, but these were linked predominantly to 
the fact that Moro, then minister of Foreign Affairs, had only had the time to read the text 
while traveling to the meeting. On the contrary and despite Israeli pressure,
43
 Scheel, the 
German minister of Foreign Affairs, welcomed the document, praising the fact that the 
Political Committee had managed to achieve a consensus on the topic, while stressing that 
such work would be pointless if it was not accompanied by an attempt to translate it into 
reality. He justified his position with reference to his meeting with the Tunisian minister of 
Foreign Affairs, in which the latter had stressed the need for third party mediation in the 
Mediterranean, along the lines of what the United States were doing in Asia. According to 
Scheel, if the Tunisian minister was right, a deterioration of the situation in the Mediterranean 
would in any case drag the Europeans more into Middle East politics.
44
 Therefore, they might 
as well define a European position to guide them. The position of Belgium and Luxembourg 
were also in agreement, whereas the Netherlands was cautious, justified by the fact that the 
government had just resigned and public opinion was closer to Israel.  
 
This unexpected convergence worried Israel. The Israeli Embassy in Paris summarised a 
leaked draft to the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs by stressing that the Europeans were 
preparing a document according to which final borders between Israel and its neighbours 
“must be identical repeat must be identical with the lines of 4 June 1967, except for minor 
and insignificant changes”.45 The reply by the Ministry to Israeli embassies in The Hague, 
Rome, Bonn, Brussels and Paris highlighted that this was a “particularly serious” 
development and instructed them to be “particularly vehement against the draft on this 
point”.46 While the document was de facto approved at the meeting of the Six in May 1971, 
the Europeans’ position after the meeting became very difficult once it was leaked to the 
German press and, under Israeli pressure, there was thus no unanimous defence of the report. 
 
The Europeans’ commitment to the Green Line strengthened in 1973. Already before the 
October 1973 war, a decision was taken in Brussels to agree to hold meetings of the EEC-
Israel trade committee in Israel, but only if they were not in breach of the UN resolutions (i.e. 
thus avoiding occupied territories). In response to the war, the by then Nine EC member 
states reinstated on 6 November 1973 “the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation 
which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967.” This text sealed the European shift in 
favour of the French interpretation of Resolution 242, namely that Israel’s withdrawal from 
the territories occupied in 1967 had to be in full, apart from minor and mutually agreed 
changes.
47
  
 
The lead up to the Venice Declaration in 1980, which came on the back of the Camp David 
Agreements and the policies of the newly elected Likud government, did not change the 
consensus on the border. Rather, it specified what was meant to be beyond it. In Venice, the 
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Nine recognised the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the need to 
associate the PLO to negotiations, while stating that all parties were entitled to live “within 
secure, recognised and guaranteed borders.” They also stressed again that Israel had to put an 
end to “the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict in 1967” and that 
Israeli settlements in the “occupied Arab [sic] territories” were “illegal under international 
law.”  
 
Between 1970 and 1973, therefore, the Europeans came to establish a discursive practice that 
made reference to the territories occupied in 1967 and thus to the Green Line, a practice that 
was re-enacted in Venice – and has continued to do so until nowadays.  
 
The establishment of this discursive practice during 1970-73 mirrored but also preceded the 
emergence of a similar discursive practice at the UN. While the UN had already addressed 
the issue of self-determination (UN GA Resolution 2672, 1970) and of PLO’s recognition 
(UN GA Resolution 3210, 1974), it remained vaguer in terms of where the border between 
the two states were to be. It was only in the period 1979-80 that the UN Security Council 
adopted a more clear-cut (and more strongly worded) set of positions,
48
 culminating in 
Resolution 465, stating that “all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, 
demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab 
territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal 
validity.”49 
 
The US moved in the same direction, generally following the Europeans’ evolution and 
generally in the case of Democratic Administrations. At first, the US interpretation was very 
close to the Europeans’ and centred on the Green Line.50 In 1977 the Carter administration 
clarified that defensible borders referred to “substantial withdrawal of Israel’s present control 
over territories” and “minor adjustments in the 1967 border”.51 But this changed with the 
arrival of Reagan,
52
 who stated that he would not ask Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 
borders, as this would place “the bulk of Israel's population […] within artillery range of 
hostile Arab armies.”53  This position was also maintained by both Bush presidents. Clinton 
sided with the Green Line, plus land swaps, and so did Obama who, in a speech on 19 May 
2011 suggested that “the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines 
with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both 
states.”54   
 
Therefore, in parallel with, but also in advance of the UN and the US, the Europeans 
established a discursive practice about where the future borders between Israel and the 
Palestinians should be and, more importantly, where they were to be for the Europeans when 
dealing with the parties, in the absence of a peace agreement. The discursive practice came to 
entail that twice per year, the Europeans would issue a declaration on the Arab-Israeli conflict 
(since 1990s referred to as the Middle East Peace Process, or MEPP). As we are going to see, 
this discursive practice has anchored economic and legal/administrative practices and the 
ensuing developments aimed to close the gap between the newly established discursive 
practice and other European practices. 
 
From discourse to economic practice: trade agreements with Israelis and Palestinians  
 
The Europeans’ discursive practice around the Green Line first turned into economic 
practice. The EC/EU being a predominantly economic macro-practice (with exclusive 
competence over trade), economic agreements have been the obvious practice through which 
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Europeans have translated their position on the Green Line. As we are going to see, economic 
practice has come to largely align itself with the discursive practice centred on the Green 
Line, with one substantial limitation. As the issue of EU-Israel trade relations has been 
widely scrutinised,
55
 the focus here is more on how the border has been progressively 
codified in the EU’s economic practice towards Israel and the Palestinians. 
 
The first opportunity for the discursive practice to affect economic practice emerged shortly 
after the 1973 EPC declaration examined above. Israel had signed a first five-year 
preferential agreement with the EEC already in 1964 and it renewed it for a further five years 
in 1970. In 1975, however, when a new EEC-Israel preferential trade agreement was signed, 
the ambiguity about whether it would include the occupied territories came to the fore. 
Protests by Arab countries were very vocal and FitzGerald, the Irish foreign minister at the 
time when Ireland was holding the EC Presidency, had to assure the Arab League secretary 
that the agreement would not apply to the territories occupied by Israel.
56
 This seemed more 
of an Irish position than a European one, though
57
 and the Arab League was not satisfied, as 
it wanted a confirmation on behalf of the EEC. It was only when this was delivered (and the 
British withdrew their reservations) that the Arab League gave its green light for the Euro-
Arab Dialogue to restart. 
 
The second step consisted in establishing separate economic relations with the Palestinians. 
The most important pieces of legislation in this respect came in 1986, when not only the EC 
granted preferential access to imports originating in the occupied Palestinian territories,
58
 but 
also acknowledged the authority of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce for issuing 
documents accompanying all exports.
59
 From this moment onwards, it was technically 
possible to import goods from beyond the Green Line under the granting authority of a 
Palestinian body and most importantly, it was no longer possible to export them under the 
EC-Israel Agreement. The establishment of two parallel, but legally separate, frameworks for 
bilateral relations was later re-affirmed within the Euro-Mediterranean framework, when the 
EC signed two separate Association Agreements, one with Israel in 1995 (into force since 
2000) and one with the PLO in 1997 (into force in the same year).  
 
Complications soon arose, however. Steeped in the optimism of the peace process, the EU 
did not formally codify its interpretation of Israel’s borders in the 1995 EU-Israel Association 
Agreement, which (once again) referred to the “territory of the State of Israel.” Following the 
law of treaties, this has left Israel free to define the geographical scope of its territories in 
accordance with domestic law, thus reflecting not only Israel’s unilateral annexation of East 
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, but also its de facto extension of its legislation and 
jurisdiction to settlements.
60
 In addition, Israel refused to recognise the 1997 EC-PLO Interim 
Agreement, arguing that it was against the 1994 Paris Protocol, according to which Israel and 
Palestine created a single customs ‘envelope’.61 This sparked reactions by the EU, which 
argued that “the West Bank and Gaza Strip constitutes a separate customs territory since the 
Palestinians can and do exercise their own trade regime.”62  
 
The difference in interpretation came to the fore as Israel was suspected and then found to 
issue certificates for goods produced in Israeli settlements located in the occupied Palestinian 
territories. To overcome this impasse, the EU opted for “a practical way of handling the 
problem” (basically, a practice).63 In 2005 it signed a Technical Arrangement with Israel, also 
known as the Olmert Arrangement, according to which Israel were to indicate the postcodes 
of the area in which the goods were produced. This did not challenge the right of Israeli 
customs authorities to issue EUR.1 certificates, but it provided European custom authorities 
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with a tool for identifying which goods originated from inside the Green Line (and were thus 
eligible for preferential treatment under the EU-Israel Association Agreement).  This 
arrangement allowed the EU to “grant a de facto meaning to its non-recognition of the 
Territories as part of the State of Israel”.64 More recently, the burden of proof shifted from 
(often under-resourced) custom authorities to private European importers, who have the 
responsibility to check goods’ origin through the postcodes’ list following the publication of 
Israeli postcodes on the website of DG TAXUD in August 2012.
65
  
 
Therefore, through the EU economic practice, the Europeans have given substance to their 
discourse centred on the Green Line, establishing a set of micro-practices that reflected the 
Green Line’s existence. Over the course of three decades, the gap between discourse and 
practice significantly narrowed. A substantial limitation remained, though, as goods produced 
in Israeli settlements continued to enter European markets, stripped of preferential treatment. 
Therefore, the gap was not totally closed (nor it could have been under existing legislation, as 
well as because of the nature of politics in general). 
 
Beyond trade: implementing the border in legal and administrative terms 
 
The Gaza war in 2008-09 and the election of Netanyahu in 2009 triggered a new 
determination amid Europeans to reinforce existing practices in order to make them fully 
consistent with their discursive practice. This newly found resolution was boosted by 
prodding of the European Parliament and non-state actors,
66
 as well as by the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) ruling in the so-called Brita case in 2010, which led to the establishment of a 
new practice and new measures based on law and administration. 
 
In February 2010, the ECJ codified formally the need for two separate territorial bases in its 
ruling on the Brita case, which concerned the import by Brita GmbH (a German company) of 
goods produced by Soda Stream in its factory in Israeli settlements. The German Customs 
authorities required payment of duties from Brita, once it was ascertained that the goods were 
not coming from the pre-1967 Israel. Brita appealed the decision and the case went in front of 
the ECJ due to the implication of EU law. The German financial court asked for an 
interpretation of EU law and bilateral treaties via the preliminary reference procedure. The 
ECJ confirmed and strengthened the view that Israel and the West Bank/Gaza Strip constitute 
two separate economic entities.
67
 Therefore, goods produced in the Israeli settlements cannot 
benefit from the preferential EU-Israel Agreement, as this practice would limit the 
effectiveness of the EU-PLO Agreement by preventing Palestinian customs authorities from 
exercising their competence. Although the ECJ did not explicitly mentioned the Green Line, 
the judgement is based on the assumption that, having the EU signed two separate 
agreements (EU-Israel and EU-PLO Association Agreements), they must have two different 
and separate territorial scopes (Israel and West Bank/Gaza Strip). The ECJ made clear that 
the scope of these agreements cannot be overlapping, as this would confer rights or impose 
duties on a third party without its consent (which is not possible under the law of treaties for 
the principle that pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt).
68
 The ECJ ruling thus makes an 
implicit but solid reference to the existence of a border between Israel and Palestine.  
 
This legal clarification about the territorial scope of the two Association Agreements spurred 
EU officials to codify more explicitly the Green Line in EU legal practice and to make use of 
available opportunities to define the territory (and thus the borders) of the state of Israel. The 
first legally significant reference to the Green Line was made in 2011,
69
 in a decision of the 
Commission concerning personal data protection.
70
 In Article 2, it refers to 
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the State of Israel, as defined in accordance with international law […]. [The decision] shall be applied 
in accordance with international law. It is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, under the terms of international law. 
 
Since then, similar territorial disclaimers have become common practice and are to be found 
in subsequent agreements between the EU and Israel. In the case of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Aviation Agreement, concluded in 2012, for instance, the “application of this Agreement is 
understood to be without prejudice to the status of the territories that came under Israeli 
administration after June 1967.”71 As further clarified in the preparatory documents, “[t]he 
Agreement should be implemented in conformity with the European Union's position that the 
territories which came under Israeli administration in June 1967 are not part of the territory of 
the State of Israel.”72 In another case (marketing standards for fruit and vegetables), the 
Regulation specified that Israel can issue the relevant conformity certificates only for the 
State of Israel as internationally defined, with the exclusion of the territories under Israel 
administration after 1967.
73
 
 
The issue of borders emerged in the case of the agreement between the EU and Israel on 
pharmaceutical products, known as ACAA.
74
 Tellingly, the question of borders was openly 
discussed in the European Parliament, which threatened to withhold its consent if the 
agreement were to cover the occupied Palestinian territories. The bone of contention was 
which authority was to be in charge of certifying the conformity of Israeli goods placed on or 
traded in the EU market. The certifying power is not a problem per se, as this competence 
does not formally have a territorial dimension. However, the problem emerged because the 
agreement was drafted in such a way that it required Israel to nominate this authority in 
accordance to its domestic law (instead of, for instance, appointing an external agency). 
Therefore Israel had no choice but to nominate the Ministry of Health, the jurisdiction of 
which has a territorial dimension – extending over the occupied territories.  
 
At first, it seemed that there would be a reverse of practice. In 2012, under extensive lobby 
from Israeli diplomats, members of the EP voted in favour of a draft that did not contain any 
disclaimer concerning the territorial scope. But the consistency with the discursive practice 
on the Green Line was ultimately re-established. Following the advice of the EP legal 
service,
75
 the Commission qualified its acknowledgement of the body nominated by Israel as 
the responsible authority under the ACAA. It specified that this was granted only on the basis 
that the occupied territories are not part of the territory covered by the Responsible Authority, 
stating once again that “the legitimate jurisdiction of Israeli authorities does not extend to the 
territories brought under Israeli administration since June 1967.”76  
 
During 2012, the legal practice was further honed and there was “a shift from just 
distinguishing between within and beyond the Green Line towards non-applicability in the 
occupied territories (i.e. in Israeli settlements) of legal regimes beneficial for Israel that are 
set up under EU law” 77. In the Council Conclusions in December 2012, the Council  
 
expresse[d] its commitment to ensure that – in line with international law – all agreements 
between the State of Israel and the European Union must unequivocally and explicitly indicate 
their inapplicability to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, namely the Golan Heights, the 
West Bank including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.
78
  
 
This in turn led to the justly famous ‘Guidelines’79 approved in July 2013, which represent 
the clearest and most encompassing turning point in the implementation of EU programmes. 
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Even though their publication was prompted by the impending approval of Horizon2020, a 
big EU-funded programme of research to which Israel participates, the Guidelines were 
drafted in such a way as to establish a consistent practice across all further programmes and 
projects the EU and Israel were to agree upon under the 2014-2020 EU budget. As the 
ensuing exchange of letters between the EU and Israel specified, whenever participation of 
Israel to EU programmes is agreed with a Memorandum of Understanding, the text will 
include the following specification: 
 
In accordance with EU policy, this agreement shall not apply to the geographic areas that 
came under the administration of the State of Israel after 5
th
 June 1967. This position should 
not be construed as prejudicing Israel’s principled position on this matter. Accordingly, the 
Parties agree that the application of this agreement is without prejudice to the status of those 
areas. 
 
This administrative act indicated how the Commission intended to execute the budget and 
implement EU legislation in relation to its programs and projects when it came to Israel’s 
territorial scope. The Guidelines therefore were the first time that the EU ensured as perfect 
an implementation of its political position on the Green Line as possible. 
 
Since the Guidelines, the EU has continued to apply the same principle beyond EU-funded 
programmes. For instance, in the case of organic farming, in October 2013, the Commission 
recognised the competence of the Israeli Plant Protection and Inspection Office to issue 
certificates for organic farming only within the Green Line,
80
 de facto stripping organic 
products of their added value and making their generally higher market price less justifiable. 
Similarly, since February 2014 the EU has recognised the competence of Israeli Veterinary 
Office to provide certificates for poultry and dairy complying with EU health and safety 
regulations only within the Green Line, thus forcing a separation between the manufacturing 
lines in Israel and the settlements and de facto banning EU import of poultry and dairy from 
settlements.
81
 These developments were accompanied by a number of advices to business, 
cautioning about risks related to economic and financial activities involving Israeli 
settlements.
82
 
 
Further developing this legal-administrative practice, the Commission issued on 11 
November 2015 an ‘Interpretative Notice on indication of origin of goods from the territories 
occupied by Israel since June 1967’. Rather than a new piece of legislation, the Notice is an 
administrative act clarifying how member states are to apply existing EU law. In particular, it 
indicates that products from Palestine should be labelled as originating from either Palestine, 
the West Bank or Gaza, while products from Israeli settlements should clearly specify that in 
brackets (e.g. ‘products from the West Bank (Israeli settlement)’) in order not to mislead 
customers about their origin.  
 
Therefore, since 2010 the Europeans, acting within the EU, have practiced a legal and 
administrative framework centred on the Green Line. They have done so by including a 
specification of the territorial scope in new agreements (or in the correspondence 
implementing them) and by limiting Israel’s certifying authority to territories within the 
Green Line. While goods from Israeli settlements can in theory continue to enter the EU 
(without preferential treatment), the limitations on Israel’s certifying authority, together with 
enhanced transparency for customers, have stripped them of key characteristics. Moreover, 
the Guidelines have established that no money from the EU budget is to go beyond the Green 
Line when Israeli settlements are involved. For the period 2009-2015, the discursive practice 
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on the Green Line thus anchored not only most of the Europeans’ economic practice, but also 
key components of their legal practice in dealing with parties on the ground. 
 
 
Conclusion: the gap that closed and then opened again 
 
This article has shown how the Europeans have acted through the EC/EU to first establish a 
discursive practice about the Green Line and then bring their economic and 
legal/administrative practices largely in line with their discourse. The early recognition of the 
Green Line, dating 1971-73, crystallised in a discourse that anchored the EC/EU economic 
relations with Israel and with the Palestinians and then legal and administrative practice too. 
The gap between ‘discourse and practice’ did not fully close, as the notable exception of 
goods from Israeli settlements remains. But it narrowed down considerably, especially during 
the period 2009-2015.  
 
It remains open to discussion how narrow the gap was by 2015, and how relevant its content 
to the overall European foreign policy practice. Keeping in mind that perfect implementation 
does not exist (and especially not in EU politics), two elements are crucial here. One is the 
trend. It is a long term trend, as it took more than three decades to operationalise into practice 
the implications of what was agreed in the early 1970s. The trend shows a slow narrowing of 
the gap until 2010, when the pace accelerates up to 2015. This trend towards narrowing the 
gap, in our opinion, is a fact that must be acknowledged. The second element is what is left 
out of this trend. The issue of goods from Israeli settlements is a notable one, but, having 
been stripped of several key components, it has lost prominence.
83
 More noteworthy is the 
issue of national foreign policies. Whereas the EU has an exclusive competence on issues 
related to trade, numerous other sectors (from research to visas) remain largely under shared 
or national jurisdiction, which makes it more difficult to follow the plot. Germany 
renegotiated a number of agreements with Israel in the light of the Guidelines, the UK led 
developments related to the business community and to labelling, but other countries, 
including France and Sweden (which recognised Palestine in 2015) have often avoided 
national practices being anchored in the same European discursive practice about the Green 
Line.
84
 This is a topic on which further investigation is needed. 
 
Moreover, it is important to stress that the gap can open up again and in fact this is exactly 
what begun to happen in 2016. The occasion was provided by the intention to issue a Council 
declaration in January 2016, making up for the ‘missed’ one in the second half of 2015. The 
three big member states (France, Germany and the UK) worked hard on a draft text that 
aimed at further spelling out how to implement the support to the Green Line. Unusually, the 
text was fully agreed already at the lower levels of the hierarchy, in the Maghreb-Machrek 
Working Group. However, despite being formally agreed upon by everybody, one 
representative reopened the discussion at the Political and Security Committee, despite the 
very short time span before the meeting of the ministers of Foreign Affairs on 18 January. 
Ultimately, the text had to be changed to secure approval. In terms of substance, the 
disagreements focused on the words “distinction” between Israel and “all” territories 
occupied by Israel in 1967 (both removed in the final text) and “united” in ensuring 
implementation (changed into “committed”). In a novel development, states spearheading the 
changes were Greece and Cyprus, with the support of the Central and Eastern European 
countries. Germany, among the sources of the original text, could not stop their opposition. 
Since then, there has been very little appetite in Brussels for another declaration. The mid-
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year deadline was de facto skipped and the end of the year one was postponed. No 
developments in economic and legal practices emerged during 2016.  
 
The approval of UNSC Resolution 2334 on 23 December 2016, which explicitly states “the 4 
June 1967 lines”, did not reverse this trend for the Europeans, as shown by disagreements and 
lack of declarations in early 2017. Not only the Conclusions to the multilateral conference 
convened by France on 15 January 2017 did not include a reference to the Green Line, but 
also the meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on the following day was unable 
to agree on Conclusions supporting the French initiative due to the opposition of Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Hungary and the UK. The FAC in February blocked the planned Association 
Council meeting with Israel, originally pencilled for 28 February, but this was due to the 
opposition of Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Sweden and the Netherlands, rather than a 
newly found consensus among member states. As the discursive practice centred on the 
Green Line is being challenged, consequences could be expected in other practices too, 
although practices tend to be more resilient than discourses.
85
 
 
What can this tell us, then, in terms of the relationship between different types of practices 
and European foreign policy in particular? What makes for a ‘good anchor’? Much depends 
on how solid and clear an anchor is. Del Sarto suggests that the Green Line is not at all a 
solid anchor and argues that fuzzy borders create fuzzy implementation.
86
 From this 
perspective, the border – while being socially constructed and a practice in and of itself– is an 
anchor not for a coherent set of practices, but rather for “incoherent implementation”. We 
argue, however, that the Green Line is a relatively solid anchor and has produced remarkable 
effects when assessed against the relentless opposition of Israel (and the often non-existent 
support of the Palestinians). In our view, the main issue lies in the way the relationship 
between practices is articulated. In this case, the direction of travel has been from discursive 
practice to non-discursive ones. This, in our opinion, contributes to explain the slow-going 
and possibly fragile link with non-discursive practices. Much of European foreign policy has 
actually developed in the opposite way, with bold innovations on the ground followed by 
codification, which seems to suggest that the shift in discourse following a shift in practice 
could be more direct and straightforward.  
 
Moreover, the discursive practice has generally occurred in Brussels, which is at times 
isolated from other practices, both in member states and on the ground. The doings of 
European diplomats in Jerusalem/Ramallah or in Tel Aviv, for instance, might possibly 
deliver a stronger entry into the web of practices that is European foreign policy.
87
 
 
Last but not least, the question remains of whether European practices can have an impact on 
the ground. There has been an undeniable change in the way in which the EU and member 
states relate to Israel. While a lot of tensions remains due to member states’ economic 
interests, the political default position in the EU and in member states has become to 
distinguish between Israel pre-1967 and the occupied Palestinian territories. As agreements 
between the EU and Israel are renewed or negotiated, this practice might continue (if only 
because of inertia) and might even be further codified. When looked at the Israeli occupation 
of the West Bank, however, Europe’s actions seem not to have affected Israel’s behaviour, as 
the occupation continues unabated. Some have suggested that the European position has even 
contributed to legitimise the continued occupation.
88
 The point we have made here, however, 
is more about Europe and the Europeans’ capacity to practice the Green Line as the political 
default position in their external action, and to align their own economic, administrative and 
legal acts with their political discourse. In the absence of a negotiated agreement, the Green 
14 
 
Line has represented the Israeli-Palestinian border in terms of European foreign policy – so 
far. 
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